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ABSTRACT 
Religious adherence can and should be quantified, but there are serious 
problems of validity and reliability in measuring religion.  Sometimes the 
problems themselves are informative about the nature of identity and its 
significance or insignificance.  Understanding the difficulties with numbers 
helps us to understand religion itself.  
 
 
* * * 
 
Introduction 
 
The articles in this special issue provide a fascinating glimpse of religion in 
numbers and the problems and rewards of quantitative research.  Our 
understanding of the issues will benefit from the attention of scholars from a 
variety of backgrounds.    
 
People see religion in different ways: as a voluntary association (in which 
membership will lapse unless regularly renewed), as something more like a 
nationality (which you can have even if you go elsewhere), or simply as an 
aspect of cultural heritage.  So why bother with religious statistics?  One 
reason is that given by Bettina Schmidt in her introduction to this issue: “While 
we cannot get a clear picture about religious belonging from national census 
data, we can find out trends about important shifts in the religious landscape.”  
 
Critics might argue that religion is too complex to allow one to record and 
classify identity in a satisfactory way.  The need to measure is a strength as 
well as a weakness, however.  While it is certainly true that quantification 
simplifies what has been observed, these methods force us to be clear about 
what we are studying.  The act of selecting and defining variables imposes a 
rigour and an openness to criticism that can more easily be escaped in 
discursive treatments of the same phenomena.  Quantification often provides 
the best or only way of testing theories about the causes and consequences 
of religious affiliation and involvement.  It is the natural perspective to use in 
discussing trends, and it facilitates international comparisons.   
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Problems of validity and reliability 
 
Although religious statistics are valuable, they do need careful handling.  I 
have maintained for some years that “a quarter of responses to any question 
on religion are unreliable” (Voas 2007, p. 149): that is to say, the respondents 
may give different answers the next time you ask.  My jocular claim to this 
principle as “Voas‟s Law” seems incomplete, however.  I should have labelled 
it “Voas‟s first law of religious statistics”, because there is also a second law.  
The second law is that a quarter of responses to any question on religion lack 
validity: that is to say, the answers do not mean what they appear to mean.  
The magnitude of the problems with reliability and validity will vary from case 
to case, of course.  Still, a quarter will sometimes be a conservative estimate 
of the proportion affected.  
 
Schmidt provides some examples: Afro-Brazilian religious practices are 
commonplace in Brazil, but only a tiny proportion of the population identifies 
with these traditions on the census.  One might argue that there is a 
comparable situation in Britain with alternative spirituality.  I am sceptical 
about the idea that these beliefs and practices are displacing traditional 
religion (Voas and Bruce 2007), but they are clearly far more widespread than 
one might suppose from the census.  Only 13,832 people in England and 
Wales wrote in „Spiritual‟ on the 2011 census form and the „New Age‟ count 
was even more miniscule at 698.   
 
In Great Britain, much of the interest in this topic arose from the contrast 
between the results of the 2001 census, when a question on religion first 
appeared, and what was known from sample surveys.  The British Social 
Attitudes survey of 2001 put affiliation with any religion at 58% in England and 
Wales, a very different result than the 79% (aged 18+) obtained from the 
census in the same year.  Moreover the 2001 census categorized 72% of 
people in England and Wales but only 65% of those in Scotland as Christian, 
notwithstanding good evidence that levels of churchgoing were slightly higher 
north of the border.  Subtle differences in the wording and context of 
questions can have a substantial impact (Voas and Bruce 2004).  
 
Japan provides an extreme example of the uncertainty around religious 
affiliation.  The Religions Yearbook published by the Ministry of Education and 
Bureau of Statistics shows Shinto totals (based on reports from the shrines) 
that amount to more than three-quarters of the total population.  The Agency 
of Cultural Affairs states that Shinto is followed by half the population, with 
many of the same people being adherents of Buddhism.  Surveys conducted 
by private groups, though, typically find that only 2 or 3% of Japanese identify 
themselves with Shintoism (Voas 2007).   
 
 
Data issues 
 
When faced with questions about religion, many people are prone to be 
facetious, idiosyncratic or simply non-compliant. An internet campaign that 
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swept through all English-speaking countries conducting censuses around 
2000-2001 encouraged people to list their religion as „Jedi Knight‟.  And we 
should not underestimate the extent to which many people are indifferent to 
religion or disinclined to answer questions about it.  The attempt to show that 
Scottish councils engage in sectarian hiring practices (Mejka 2014) is 
completely undermined by the fact that “the current level of staff designated 
as „unknown‟ in terms of whatever they identify as religion or belief is at 
85.59% ... Given that the „unknowns‟ vastly outnumber self-identified 
Catholics and Protestants, the cautious analyst would conclude that such data 
can tell us nothing at all about local authority hiring policies. All they tell us is 
that most council workers do not want to declare their religion (or lack of it)” 
(Bruce, forthcoming 2014).  
 
For some measures of religious affiliation, the very small numbers in certain 
categories make the data sensitive to coding and similar errors.  In Scotland, 
the published total of people writing in „another religion‟ on the 2001 census 
form was about 27,000. A later, more detailed count (commissioned by the 
Pagan Federation) revealed that most of those respondents described 
themselves as Jedi Knights and many of the remainder specified a Christian 
denomination and so belong in a different category. In fact only 5,400 (or 20% 
of the number published) genuinely belong to „another religion‟, most of them 
being Pagans or Spiritualists.  
 
Kevin Brice makes use of data on religion of upbringing and current religion 
from the 2001 census in Scotland (which was discussed, for example, in Voas 
2006).  He takes the ingenious step of applying this mover-stayer matrix to the 
2011 census output from England and Wales.  While the method is well worth 
using, it does seem to me that in statements like “Prior to the Census 2001 ... 
the only way that a classification by religious affiliation could be obtained was 
to use simplistic assumptions about religious affiliations based on ethnic 
groups”, Brice ignores the existence and importance of sample surveys.  Even 
now, most of what we know about religion in Britain comes from surveys, not 
censuses.  Surveys cover a wider range of measures of religious involvement 
and upbringing, not to mention a wider range of attitudinal and socio-
demographic background measures.  The strengths of the census are very 
specific, with good data for small areas being one of the most important.  The 
census has generated a great deal of interest among scholars in religious 
studies, but it is by no means the only game in town.      
 
 
Noise, churn, measurement artefacts – or real change?  
 
Often the unreliability is just noise and has no effect on the identification of 
trends.  For example, a comparison of waves 1 and 9 (1991 and 1999) of the 
British Household Panel Survey shows that the frequency distribution of 
religious affiliation is utterly static, from which it is tempting to conclude that 
religious identity is a stable attribute. Closer examination at the individual 
rather than the aggregate level reveals that a remarkable 27% of respondents 
interviewed in both surveys supplied different religious labels for themselves 
at the two dates. No doubt some of those panel members really did change 
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allegiance (between denominations or between affiliation and no religion), but 
it is likely that many are simply uncertain or ambivalent. The line between „C 
of E‟ (Church of England) and „none‟ can be rather fuzzy.  Even in the United 
States, a substantial number of people go back and forth between stating a 
religious preference and saying that they have no religion (Lim, MacGregor, 
and Putnam 2010).  
 
A similar amount of churn can be seen in census data on current religion 
versus religion of upbringing.  As noted by Kevin Brice, the main shifts are 
from religion to no religion, but there is some movement in the opposite 
direction.  To state, though, that “a simple application of the „secularisation 
thesis‟ does not sufficiently explain actual change of religion in the population” 
strikes me as unjustified.  The secularisation thesis does not predict that no 
one in modern societies can acquire religion or become more religious: it 
simply implies that all else being equal the dominant trend will be in the 
opposite direction, which is what we find.  
 
There are some instances where the sensitivity of responses to the way in 
which a question is asked overcomes any straightforward interpretation of the 
data.  David Václavík reports a remarkable jump in the number of people in 
the Czech Republic who declined to answer the census question on religion: 
the figure went from 9% in 2001 to 45% in 2011.   Shifts of this magnitude do 
not happen by accident, and the wording of the question is automatically 
suspect in cases like this one.  A close examination of the forms confirms that 
suspicion.  In 2001, the question simply presented two tick-boxes: “without 
denomination” and “believer”, followed by space to write in the name of the 
religious group.  In 2011, the statement that the question was voluntary was 
prominently displayed.  Moreover, while the 2001 question merely asked 
respondents to be specific in writing in their denomination, the 2011 question 
contained an instruction to write in the name of the denomination as listed in 
the accompanying guidance notes.  It is hardly surprising that a large 
proportion of people chose abstention as the easier option.  I am inclined to 
agree with Václavík‟s views on the rise in indifference, but the alteration in the 
census form makes the interpretation of the data far from clear cut.  
 
A similar example can be found in comparing the 1986 and 1991 results from 
Australia.  In 1986 the question required the religion to be written in, while in 
1991 the census form provided tick-boxes for the most common 
denominations.  One striking consequence was that the number of native-born 
Presbyterians aged 20 and over increased by a third relative to the 1986 total.  
By implication, a quarter of self-identified Presbyterians in 1991 were so 
nominal that they would have been unwilling or unable to spell out the name 
of their denomination.  (Catholic, Anglican, and Uniting Church numbers 
received more modest boosts.)   
 
Likewise Gunnar Thorvaldsen‟s graph showing the sharp rise in the number of 
Norwegians with no religion seems very likely to depict not only the inroads of 
secularization but also the simplification of the census form in 1970, where 
“Does not belong to any denomination” was one of just three options available 
to be ticked.  
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The 1970 British Cohort Study offers a good opportunity to test the 
consistency of responses to questions on religion for a single cohort over 
three decades (Voas forthcoming).  One striking finding is how unreliable 
cohort members are in reporting whether they had been raised in a religion.  
The sweeps in 2004 and 2012, when the respondents were aged 34 and 42, 
included essentially identical questions on religious upbringing.  At the 
individual level, nearly a quarter (24%) of people changed their answers 
between the two dates (as shown in the table below and indeed as predicted 
by Voas‟s first law).  The inconsistency seems astonishing given that 
respondents were reporting in mid-life on a fixed past rather than a shifting 
present.  The vague recollection may imply that their religious upbringing was 
weak, or it might simply reflect a lack of clarity in the question.  It is not easy to 
say what is entailed by being raised in a religion.  
 
Furthermore the aggregate responses at the two dates were very different.  In 
total, only 56% in the earlier year said that they had been raised according to 
a religion, while eight years later the figure was 68%.  The explanation is very 
likely to lie in differences in how the data were collected (or what survey 
researchers call mode effects).  In 2004 the religion questions were asked in a 
face-to-face interview, whereas in 2012 they appeared on the self-completion 
form.  The earlier version was a two-stage question (first a yes/no filter, then a 
list of religious groups), and respondents will have learned during the 
interview that answering „yes‟ to such a question would elicit the follow-up 
„which?‟  For anyone hoping to reach the end, answering „no‟ would be the 
more attractive option.  
  
 
 „Thinking first of your childhood, were you raised according to any particular 
religion?‟ 
Responses in 2004 and 2012 (% of total) 
 
 2012 response 
2004 
response 
Yes  No  
Yes 50 6 
No 18 26 
 
    N = 6,958 
 
 
 
Refining the instruments 
 
Some of the difficulties we encounter may come from the contrast between 
what is being measured and how it is measured.  Religious commitment is a 
continuous variable.  We picture an underlying scale with Richard Dawkins at 
one end and the Pope at the other; most of the population lies somewhere 
between the two.  The questions we ask on surveys acknowledge this 
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variability: attendance at services may be anything from „never‟ to „daily‟, the 
importance of religion in life will be recorded as a value from 0 to 10, a 
standard question about belief in God offers half a dozen response categories 
that express varying degrees of doubt, and so on.  Religious identity, 
however, is typically registered as binary: some religion or no religion.  The 
reality is of course far more complex.  
 
Just as people believe or participate to varying degrees, their religious 
identities may range from non-existent through nominal to somewhat 
important to completely central.  This sense of identity may derive from one or 
more of family heritage, ritual initiation, religious upbringing, education, 
marriage, communal belonging, ethnic assertion, formal membership, 
religious values, cultural affinity, external perception, or something else.  It 
may emerge more or less strongly in different times and places, and 
individuals may be more or less ambivalent about the affiliations for which 
they are eligible.  Out of this nuanced and arguably multi-dimensional 
construct one generates an answer to the question „what is your religion?‟  
 
The General Social Survey in the United States has tried to capture degrees 
of religious identification since 1974.  The standard question about affiliation 
leads to the follow-up “Would you call yourself a strong X or a not very strong 
X?”, where X is the group chosen.  Although the question is posed as a binary 
choice, answers of “somewhat strong” are coded; about one in ten 
respondents volunteer this description of their affiliation.  There is a limit to the 
refinement and complexity that can be captured by survey forms, but we do 
not need to be limited to yes/no questions about religious identity.  The 
distinction between strong and weak identification is arguably more reliable 
than that between affiliation and outright non-affiliation, and sometimes 
relative indifference is precisely what is of most interest.  
 
 
Combining quantitative and qualitative data 
 
We need quantitative data in order to discuss big issues such as the alleged 
growth in alternative spirituality, the supposed persistence of Christian belief 
among non-churchgoers, the apparent strength of evangelical and charismatic 
congregations, the relative religiosity of women, the degree of commitment of 
young European Muslims, and so on.  Unless we are content with guesswork, 
we have to collect information from representative groups of people through 
social surveys.  Without empirical evidence of this kind, we have nothing but 
case studies, the representativeness of which would be impossible to judge.  
Happily, experience shows that we can collect meaningful quantitative data on 
religious identity, belief and practice.  A number of the studies in this issue 
report on qualitative studies that aimed to elucidate the meaning of 
quantitative findings.   
 
James Cox and Adam Possamai talked to Aboriginal Australians in order to 
understand why the 2011 census shows them to be fractionally more non-
religious than the general population.  As an aside, one might argue about the 
comparison: while it is true that „no religion‟ amounted to 22.3% of the overall 
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population, it was 24.5% among the native-born.  It seems most appropriate to 
compare Aboriginals to other people born in Australia.  In conjunction with the 
younger age structure of the Aboriginal population and the generational 
gradient in religious affiliation, Aboriginals are still slightly more likely to have a 
religion than other Australian-born individuals of the same age.  This small 
quibble does not detract from the interest of the basic finding, however.   
 
What emerges for Cox and Possamai is that Aboriginals are very much like 
everyone else in their understanding of religion, both in the views expressed 
and in the variety of those views.  The authors conclude that “the concept 
non-religion has important implications for understanding not only the history 
of and contemporary movements related to „religion and non-religion‟ in 
Western, industrialised societies but equally among indigenous populations.”  
The question that remains, though, is whether this statement applies only to 
such populations in modern societies or also to traditional societies.  I am 
highly sympathetic to the arguments advanced in this article, but Aboriginal 
Australians in the early 21st century are well acquainted with Western 
worldviews.   
 
Simeon Wallis provides some fascinating qualitative material on the views of 
young adolescents in England who identify with no religion.  He writes that the 
data show “the importance of reflecting on what the term „religion‟ means to 
respondents in order to understand why they might claim „no religion‟”.  It 
would likewise be interesting to hear what it means for respondents who do 
claim an affiliation; one suspects that in many cases the answers might be 
much the same.  Wallis argues in a footnote that his work does not require a 
parallel study of „religious‟ young people, and it is true that his findings are 
interesting on their own.  Nevertheless, the absence of a comparison group 
makes it harder to know what is distinctive about the non-religious.  
 
 
Diversity: religious identity and other traits 
 
Martin Stringer considers the extent to which superdiversity (Vertovec 2007) 
might help to dissolve the close association between ethnicity, religion, 
language, national origin and related characteristics.  The mutually reinforcing 
nature of such characteristics arguably tends to generate enclaves and 
„parallel lives‟ (Cantle 2008).  Stringer‟s discussion is insightful and profoundly 
sensible.  He helps us to see that there are two possible components of 
superdiversity: sheer multiplicity (in particular of national origin) and the 
potential independence of the various identities.  There is no doubting that 
many more groups are represented now than in the past, but that multiplicity 
does not seem to have broken the links between (for example) ethnicity and 
religion.   
 
The census helps us to study „the diversity of diversity‟, and indeed some 
years ago I wrote a paper with that very title (Voas and Williamson 2001).  In 
that work, I argued that geodemographic classification (in which areas are 
pigeonholed into categories such as „leafy green suburb‟) is misleading 
because within-group differences are often larger than between-group 
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differences, and the qualities used to define each class are often only loosely 
associated with each other.  The same argument applies to ethno-religious 
groups.  The critical issue, as Stringer makes plain, is how far and in what 
circumstances the diversity of diversity trumps the continuing strength of some 
central identities.  He pinpoints the sort of uncertainty that I sense in daily life 
as a resident of inner London.  On the one hand, when I go to the shops or 
the local gym I am immersed in a multicultural world in which age, gender, 
personal interests and so on matter more than religion and ethnicity.  On the 
other hand, I am fully conscious that for all the apparent goodwill, many of my 
neighbours and I do lead fairly separate lives.  No doubt some of that 
differentiation is economic, but cultural divides have clearly not vanished.  
 
Vladislav Serikov also stresses diversity, in this case among German 
Muslims.  Although the Muslim populations of each large European country 
seem distinctive (being predominantly North African in France, South Asian in 
Britain, and Turkish in Germany), there is a great deal of heterogeneity in 
each of these populations, not only in national origin but also in religious 
commitment.  Here the interesting issue is whether the high salience of Islam 
(both for Muslims and for non-Muslims) will create identities and boundaries 
that override the internal diversity that clearly exists.  
 
 
From religion to religiosity and beyond 
 
The articles in this issue have largely focused on religious self-identification.  
The problems of reliability and validity are not specific to questions on 
affiliation, of course.  Religiosity (that is to say religious commitment) is 
possibly even more difficult to measure.  Something as apparently objective 
as attendance at services can be surprisingly difficult to pin down (Hadaway et 
al. 1993, Hadaway & Marler 2005).  Ironically, respondents may persuade 
themselves that to tell the literal truth about their non-attendance in the past 
week would mislead the interviewer about what would „normally‟ be true.  
Similarly, the validity of responses on belief often seems open to doubt.  We 
cannot conclude from the fact that people tell pollsters they believe in God or 
life after death that they give the matter any thought, find it significant, will feel 
the same next year, or plan to do anything about it.  As Wallis points out, 
some respondents may be so oblivious to matters of religion that the mere act 
of asking about it may create the opinion that we then record.  
 
It would be easy to become discouraged by these problems.  My own view is 
rather the reverse.  The complexity of the topic is precisely what justifies 
acquiring knowledge.  If everything could be taken at face value, there would 
be no need for scholarship.  Census and survey data can tell us an enormous 
amount about religion and society; we just need to deploy the appropriate 
blend of scepticism and sophistication in handling the numbers.  It is good to 
see how much is being done.  
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